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TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION REPORT
Introduction
1. The Commission heard submissions from a variety of authoritative sources that
the war in Sierra Leone was largely the result of failures in governance and
government institutions.1 Successive regimes diminished the state's
capacity to meet such critical challenges as the security and livelihood of its
citizens, let alone to provide for democratic participation in decision-making
processes.
2. In this chapter, the Commission sets out to explore how unsound governance
created a context conducive for the interplay of poverty, marginalisation, greed
and grievances that caused and sustained the conflict. The Commission hopes its
treatment of governance issues in its report - by identifying past distortions,
evaluating the adequacy of current remedies and making recommendations to fill
the gaps - will enhance efforts towards national recovery, stability and
reconciliation.
3. The Commission understands governance to mean a system of laws, institutions,
processes and practices that promotes and protects the fundamental rights and
freedoms, as well as facilitating the development and advancement, of people
living in any given territory. Accordingly, the instruments of good governance
include equitable laws, efficient institutions, due processes and humane
practices that lead to such desired ends as security, justice, enhanced
livelihoods and democratic participation. People living in a particular
territory include citizens and non-citizens, as well as majority and minority
groups. Proper governance is therefore not only about serving citizens, but
also about regulating and securing the rights of minorities, of which
non-citizens constitute a significant component.
4. The perceptions adduced by the Commission during its hearings indicate that
the people of Sierra Leone yearn for a principled system of governance. They
want a system that upholds the rule of law over the rule of strong patrons and
protects the people from the abuse of rulers through a system of checks and
balances. They wish to see horizontal and vertical accountability through the
effective operation of such institutions as the judiciary, the auditor general's
office, the electoral commission, the media and civil society.
5. The Commission has looked at the record of each administration in the
post-independence period on the following critical 'indicators': separation of
powers; decentralisation; public participation in democratic processes; the
independence of the judiciary; the rule of law; and the existence and effective
operation of oversight bodies and institutions of accountability.
6. The Commission has analysed approximations towards or deviations from proper
governance on two levels. First, it has reviewed the basic legal documents of
the land, such as Constitutions and the evolving body of laws, to assess whether
'indicators' of proper governance were enshrined and guaranteed. Second, it has
assessed the manifestation of these 'indicators' in practice.
7. This methodical approach has enabled the Commission to draw conclusions about
the extent to which each of the post-independence governments contributed to the
structural and proximate causes of the conflict in 1991. The chapter ends by
discussing the lessons of Sierra Leone's past in the context of the obstacles to
proper governance that still exist to the present day.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
8. For good governance to obtain, the three branches of government - the
executive, the legislature and the judiciary - must be separate and independent
of one another, and each must have the requisite power to fulfil its functions.
The constitutional provisions that ensure the separation of powers must not
merely exist on paper, but rather must be developed and reaffirmed continuously
in their application. A failure to respect this separation inevitably allows
one branch of government - most often the executive - to act in an unaccountable
fashion and to influence or undermine the work of the other two. A government
that permits little or no restraint on its own powers is an authoritarian
government, which epitomises bad governance. In analysing the pre-war period in
Sierra Leone, the Commission regards authoritarianism, wherever it occurred, as
a direct cause of injustice and, accordingly, as a cause of the conflict.
9. The Independence Constitution of Sierra Leone in 1961 created a parliamentary
system in the Westminster mould, with apparently less than absolute separation
of powers between the three branches of government. The Governor General2
delegated executive power to the Prime Minister and his cabinet, who were chosen
from among Members of Parliament.3
10. Promisingly, the Constitution created room for checks and balances in the
relationship between the executive and the legislature. For example, every
decision of the Prime Minister was subject to Parliamentary approval and the
Governor General had to be notified in advance. Equally, the Governor General
could not act on major issues such as the proposed dissolution of the Parliament4
without the approval of Prime Minister. Moreover, the Governor General could
not remove the Prime Minister from office unless it appeared to him that the
Prime Minister no longer commanded the support of a majority of the Members of
Parliament.
11. However, at the practical level, parliament's ability to hold the executive
to account was restricted. At the time of independence in April 1961, Parliament
comprised of a loose coalition of Members from various parties who had been
brought together a year earlier by the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). In a
spirit of compromise on the eve of independence, representatives with
contrasting political beliefs had formed the cross-party United National Front
to secure a smooth transition into self-rule. The main beneficiary of this
arrangement was the SLPP, which managed to subsume most of its opposing parties
by awarding Ministerial positions to their leaders in the first independence
government. This crude exercise in coalition building by the SLPP marked the
beginning of weakened party politics in Parliament, undermined the relationship
of individual politicians with the executive branch and disabled Parliament's
capacity to check executive excesses in subsequent eras.
12. The independence settlement created two judicial tiers of contrasting
character. The first, superior tier was set up to dispense English common law
and its courtrooms modelled themselves on their English counterparts. There
were three courts operating under English common law: the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeal and the High Court. They mainly served inhabitants of the
capital Freetown and the surrounding Western Area.5 There were no
Magistrate Courts until Act No. 31 of 1965 provided for their establishment.6
13. This superior tier of the judiciary remained separate from the executive
during the period from 1961 to 1964. It had control over its own financial
resources, operating an autonomous 'Judiciary Account' into which all monies
obtained from court fines or charges, as well as Government allocations, were
deposited directly. The Chief Justice and all judges of the High Court had
tenure of office until 62 years of age. They could only be removed in very
limited circumstances, with the approval of the Judicial Service Commission.7
The Attorney General was not classified as a Ministerial Office8 but
as a public one, to which non-politicians with the necessary legal
qualifications would be appointed. The Commission found no evidence of any
direct executive interference in the operations of the superior tier during Sir
Milton Margai's regime.
14. The second tier consisted of local 'courts' in the Provinces, where over 80%
of the population lived. The 'courts' were a facet of the traditional system of
customary law and depended on the moral authority of Chiefs and community
elders. Act No. 20 of 1963, which formalised this second tier, contained no
provision for legal practitioners to have audience before the local courts.
During Sir Milton Margai's regime, the executive abused the local court system
to suppress the activities of the opposition All People's Congress (APC) party
at Chiefdom level.9
15. The death of Sir Milton Margai in 1964 and the assumption of the office of
Prime Minister by his brother, Sir Albert Margai, brought about ominous changes
in the checks and balances between the executive, Parliament and the judiciary.
Using the ambiguous Section 58 (2) of the Constitution,10 the
Governor General appointed Sir Albert Margai as Prime Minister without any
formal procedure to ascertain whether he or any of the other contenders for the
position commanded the support of the majority in the House. It was a classic
case of imposed executive supremacy over Parliament.
16. Thereafter Parliament increasingly squandered its opportunities to curb
executive excesses. It failed to block Prime Minister Albert Margai's misuse of
Government funds for personal gain because it hardly bothered to monitor public
income and expenditure. For example, the opposition APC newspaper "We Yone"
alleged that Sir Albert had used huge sums of money to buy buildings in
Washington and London, which he then rented to the Sierra Leone Missions in
those countries for private gain.11 Parliament failed to investigate
these allegations, despite the need to transmit a clear message of
accountability to the general public. This lapse precipitated a sense of
resignation among Sierra Leoneans that corruption was an inevitable indulgence
of government, in which Parliament was far more likely to acquiesce than to find
fault or demand sanction.
17. Parliament failed to study or challenge effectively the Bills that could
have made Sierra Leone a one-party State in 1966 and it supported the
Absenteeism Bill, which led to the removal from Parliament of four members of
the opposition in 1965. Similarly, there was no democratic dissent to the
objectionable Public Order Act of 1965. The laws that came through Parliament
in this period gave wide powers to the Executive to clamp down on opposition
activities and dissent. The legacies of this regime would be used extensively
in later years to bypass the judiciary and eliminate opponents of the government
through arbitrary arrest and detention.
18. Other actions during Sir Albert Margai's rule that set the trend towards
increased executive dominance12 included the promotion of Chief
Justice Bankole-Jones to Presidency of The Court of Appeal in order to replace
him with the entirely unqualified Gershon Collier.13 The latter was
a close associate of Sir Albert Margai and his role as Chief Justice would allow
him to sit on election petition cases and manipulate them in favour of the
ruling SLPP.
19. Sir Albert Margai also used the local courts and Chiefs to restrain the
opposition party's activities yet more severely. He acquired the power to
appoint the President of Native Administrative Courts through the Local Court
Act of 1963 and thereby completely robbed the local judiciary of its
independence.14 The courts became practically an extension of the
SLPP party machine, proceeding to harass APC stalwarts in places such as Koya
Chiefdom and Makeni Town in 1965.15
20. After the disgraceful election standoff, in March 1967 the constitution was
suspended and all executive and legislative power was concentrated in the hands
of the junta called the National Reformation Council (NRC), which ruled by
decree. Thus there was no separation of powers nor checks and balances as the
actions of the military council could not be challenged in any court of law.
21. Although democratic government was purportedly reinstated with the
inauguration of Siaka Stevens and the APC, the separation of powers would in
fact suffer a series of devastating reverses from 1968 onwards. The first
fundamental blow occurred in April 1971 when Sierra Leone was made a Republic
with an executive President. The manner in which this major constitutional
change was effected seemed to confirm the demise of both Parliament and the
judiciary as institutions capable of averting Stevens' drive towards absolute
power. Fewer than ten out of the sixty parliamentarians opposed the Republican
Bill of 1971.
22. The Republican Bill made changes to the Independence Constitution, with the
Chief Justice replacing the Queen as a ceremonial Head of State. Within 48
hours of the creation of the Republic and the swearing-in of Chief Justice Cole,
however, Parliament adopted further constitutional changes, transforming this
ceremonial Presidency into an executive one. The Chief Justice, who had just
been sacked as ceremonial President, then swore in the Prime Minister, Siaka
Stevens, as executive President. This extraordinary sequence of events
represented a fatal complicity by the judiciary in its own subordination and
manipulation by the executive.
23. With such a stranglehold on power, Stevens and his associates arranged for
important court cases to be tried by their friends, tribesmen and loyal
servants. In the notorious treason trial of Mohamed Sorie Forna and 14 others,
from 1971 to 1973, a relative of the then First Vice-President, Sorie Ibrahim
Koroma, served as a juror. According to memoirs published subsequently, the
trial judge briefed the Vice-President about the progress of the case on a daily
basis.16
24. Inevitably, the term of the head of government (now the President) was to be
extended without reference to the electorate, despite his original tenure as
Prime Minister having been limited to a period of five years. Parliament became
nothing more than a rubber stamp institution. In 1970 and 1972, without much
debate or scrutiny, Parliament endorsed two decisions by the executive that have
significantly hampered the development of the country. First the closure of the
Sierra Leone railway, which served as a vital link between the capital and the
Provinces, was endorsed by Parliament without reference to the potential
economic consequences for the population. Second, in 1972, Parliament blindly
approved the abolition of District Councils and elected Local Government. These
were archetypal bad governance decisions, for they centralised power and
influence in Freetown, whilst suffocating the delivery of resources and services
to the majority population in the Provinces.
25. Court cases involving elections under the APC were decided in favour of the
APC by a compliant judiciary. Violent by-elections conducted under a state of
emergency between 1969 and 1970 led to the loss of 23 SLPP opposition seats.
Thus by the time the Republican Constitution was passed in 1971, the APC
commanded more than the two-thirds majority necessary to pass whatever bill it
deemed necessary. With an executive President and an obedient legislature and
judiciary, the creation of a dictatorial system and destruction of state
institutions took hold.17
26. The promulgation of a one-party constitution in 1978 unmasked all pretence
to democracy and the principle of separation of powers from the Siaka Stevens
regime. Chapter III, Section 21 (4) of the 1978 Constitution personalised the
office of President - solely for Siaka Stevens - and extended his term of office
to seven years.18 In the moment the Constitution took effect, the 11
SLPP members still in Parliament were given the stark choice of joining the APC
or losing their seats.19 To their discredit, all of them joined the
APC.
27. Powers vested in the President, in relation to both Parliament and the
judiciary, were substantially increased under the One-Party Constitution.
Chapter IV, Section 34 gave the President the power to appoint an Electoral
Commissioner who would be responsible solely to him. Also, the central
committee of the party, controlled by the President, was entitled to reject
candidates for Parliament even where such people were the choice of the people
in their constituencies.20
28. Constitutional provisions also simplified the procedures under which
electoral candidates could be returned unopposed,21 a practice that
was frequently invoked. Parliamentarians elected in the one-party state were
only accountable to the president and the APC party machinery. There was
essentially no check on the actions of the executive. In one example that
became infamous across the continent, Parliament failed to scrutinise the budget
outlay for the hosting of the OAU in 1980, allowing scarce national revenue to
be wasted on the megalomania of President Stevens.
29. The Auditor General had been mandated by Constitutions since 1961 to oversee
government finances and ensure their outlay in the manner provided for by
parliament. However, whilst the institution worked relatively effectively
during Sir Milton Margai's regime, its capacity to ensure sound financial
monitoring gradually diminished from the time of Sir Albert Margai through to
the eve of the conflict. As government expenditure passed unregulated,
corruption blossomed. The quality of service provision in the public sector
plummeted across the spectrum, affecting security and justice just as it
affected health and education. Meanwhile other oversight bodies such as the
Electoral Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman were rendered equally
redundant.
30. Yet perhaps the most flagrant breach of the separation of powers under
President Stevens was reserved for the executive's control of the judiciary.
Section 113 of the One-Party constitution stipulated that the President would
appoint the Chief Justice (the head of the judiciary).22 The
President also had the right to suspend the Chief Justice or, acting in
accordance with the advice of the First Vice-President, any other judge.
31. Judges abandoned their independence to preserve their jobs, as they faced
the possibility of arbitrary removal or suspension if they incurred the
displeasure of the executive. The provision in the 1978 constitution permitting
the President to compulsorily "retire" judges who had attained the age of 5523
was a potent weapon in the hands of the executive. It was especially so because
most of the judges were well past the age of 55 at the time the Constitution
came into effect. In its most abusive application the provision was cited to
depose two successive Chief Justices of the country, namely Justice C. O. E.
Cole and Justice Livesey Luke.
32. The financial autonomy of judges was also far from assured. The
determination of their conditions of service was subject to the one-party
parliament and any improvement of these conditions required prior approval from
the President. The self-accounting system that enabled the judiciary to have
control over its income was discontinued. The judiciary thus became wholly
financially dependent on the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry provided
inadequate resources and the arrangement precipitated the ascendancy of corrupt
practices throughout the justice system.24
33. Another act of contempt towards the separation of powers was the merger of
the Office of Attorney General with that of Minister of Justice by the 1978
constitution. The Minister, also a Member of Parliament, retained supervisory
power over the judiciary, and gained discretionary power in the prosecution of
cases. Thus the joint office of Attorney General and Minister of Justice became
a fusion of executive, legislative, judicial and prosecutorial powers,25
and it remains just as problematic to the present day.
34. The ruling political class assumed absolute power and carved out a 'legal
position' that deprived all its opponents of their basic rights as Sierra
Leoneans. The outright supremacy of the executive and its domination of the
other arms of government did not alter under President Momoh's tenure of office
between 1985 and 1992. The one party constitution that destroyed the doctrine
of separation of powers was firmly in place, along with the devastating
perception on the part of many opponents that only armed rebellion could bring
it down.
DECENTRALISATION
35. The process of decentralisation is intended to ensure that political power
and the activity of government should impact positively on all levels of the
society. The rationale is that a decentralised system of government allows for
better delivery of public services and facilitates constant interaction between
politicians, administrators and those they govern. Over-centralisation
generally translates into inequity, particularly due to poor service delivery to
peripheral regions and the vulnerable sectors of society.
36. There were two main structures of local government at independence in 1961.
The first was the traditional local government structure that revolved around
Chiefdoms, paramount Chiefs and the hierarchies they formed. The second
included district councils, town councils and the Freetown City Council.
37. With the exception of the Freetown City Council, which was created by the
Freetown Municipality Ordinance of 1893, the councils owed their existence to
laws passed between 1946 and 1950. The 12 district councils representing Sierra
Leone's 12 administrative districts were created in 1946. These councils were
granted purely advisory roles.26 The system was expanded in 1950 by
the District Council Ordinance to include promotion of the economic development
of the district and of the welfare of its people, using funds at the council's
disposal. The town councils were situated in Bo, Kenema, Makeni, Koidu and New
Sembehun. All local government structures were under the control of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs.
38. Under Sir Milton Margai the councils and decentralised local government
structures functioned efficiently and continued to deliver vital services in
education, health and agriculture, as well as small-scale construction of
community facilities. However the councils had a number of weaknesses that
placed them at the mercy of officials of the central government. Primarily,
since their very existence was not entrenched in the constitution, they depended
on the passing mood of the executive and the central legislature. Moreover,
their establishing laws subjected them to administrative and political dominance
of the Minister and his officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Thus they
were ultimately accountable to the central government rather than to the people
of their various local bases.
39. Other weaknesses included the reliance of the councils on central government
for up to 70% of their operational costs, their sub-ordination by Paramount
Chiefs and the ease with which district council finances could be mismanaged and
misappropriated. These weaknesses were ripe for exploitation by the
over-centralising tendencies of successive governments. Sir Milton Margai set a
precedent with his incapacitation of the opposition-controlled Kono District
Council by withholding its operational funds.27 Also, rather than
reform district councils, Sir Milton Margai's regime suspended several of them
on grounds of alleged financial malpractice in 1962. There were to remain
neglected until 1967, as Sir Albert Margai would make no attempt to review local
governance structures.
40. Though the traditional tier of local government was entrenched in the
constitution, its office-holders were in reality placed under administrative and
supervisory control by officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Chiefs
could be suspended, dethroned or banished from their Chiefdoms by the central
government. Chief Mbriwa of Kono, for instance, was unceremoniously banished
from his Chiefdom by Sir Milton Margai.
41. When reform arrived, under the National Reformation Council (NRC) junta
regime, it merely accelerated the demise of local government and decentralised
administration. The NRC established a pivotal Commission of Enquiry led by
Justice Bekou-Betts, which exposed rampant malpractice across government.28
Among the measures taken as a result were the arrests and detention of several
Paramount Chiefs. It created public suspicion of Chiefs along with something of
a power vacuum at the traditional local government level.
42. In 1972, the Siaka Stevens regime dissolved local governments all over the
country. Whilst town councils were replaced by committees of management, the
district councils were not to be revived during the entire rule of the APC up to
the outbreak of conflict.
43. Governance was clearly over-centralised during the
regime of Siaka Stevens. Provincial and rural areas were left to their own
devices and their inhabitants became disenchanted with the political system. In
its submission to the TRC, the National Commission for Democracy and Human
Rights (NCDHR) stated:
"The abolition of local
government system and its replacement by officers appointed by the centre
(Freetown) led to marginalisation of the rural people. This, coupled with the
centre's co-option of the traditional chiefs, increased the alienation. These
two acts amounted to marginalisation and made many rural people to be receptive
to the propaganda of the rebels and more tolerant to their presence."29
44. From 1972 onwards, socio-economic development in the
Provinces was handled by central government agencies far removed from the
people. The only alternative development assistance came from local or
international NGOs who instigated their own activities at district level.
Despite their many weaknesses, district councils had at least supplied water,
roads, health care, agricultural services and rudimentary communal facilities
during the 1960s. It would have been eminently more prudent to institute
measured reforms of local governance rather than dissolving the councils
outright.
45. As it was, the dissolution of district councils gradually stifled the flow
of services to people in most of the Provinces. Riverine districts like Bonthe
and Kambia, as well as remote ones like Koinadugu, Pujehun and Kailahun,
received no electricity or pipe-borne water. Bridges and roads were in a state
of disrepair and few schools or health centres survived. The whole of the North
had neither running tap water nor electricity by the end of the 1970s. These
were facets of regression rather than underdevelopment, as previous governments
had apparently left several such facilities intact.30
46. The management committee system introduced into towns and municipalities
effectively ensured that appointed individuals were more accountable to their
political patrons than to the people they served. The decline in services such
as sanitation, as well as poor maintenance of roads, streets, markets, slaughter
houses, cemeteries, fire stations and public toilets were rooted in the
abolition of elected municipal and town councils.
47. The dissolution of the councils also led to the emergence of members of the
so-called "political elite" with no apprenticeship in governance at the local
level being elevated to the national political stage. This trend, which has
snowballed from 1972 right up to 2003, led to the installation of
decision-makers whose actions were disastrously uninformed by the needs of
ordinary people. Medical practitioners and teachers in the provincial
communities were often the last to receive salaries. The provision of basic
services in the Provinces collapsed long before it did in Freetown.
MASS PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
48. Good governance necessarily encompasses democracy, with an opportunity for
the general populace to express its voice through regular elections. People
should have opportunities to establish and belong to political parties, which in
themselves should have organised internal systems of electing and replacing
leadership according to the wishes of the membership. Bad governance obtains
where the governing party engages in anti-democratic practices to undermine its
opposition, or where political parties are themselves undemocratic. Where
decisions are taken by an elite few people without reference to a wider
constituency, they are less likely to reflect the interests of the majority. In
such a situation, exclusionary politics prevails and discrimination against
particular groups or regions is likely.
49. Sierra Leone's political scene has been dominated since independence in 1961
by two political parties - the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) and the All
Peoples Congress (APC). With the exception of the thirteen-month NRC military
interregnum from 1967 to 1968, these two parties ruled the country for the 30
years between independence in 1961 and the outbreak of conflict in 1991. At the
time of writing, the SLPP has ruled the country since the return of multi-party
democracy in 1996. The APC, overthrown by the NPRC junta in 1992, is now the
largest opposition party.
50. The increasing regionalism31 and undemocratic strategies employed
by these two parties have impacted negatively on the political process in Sierra
Leone. A string of alternative parties have mounted challenges in the past,
often to address particular political crises, but have ultimately gone down as
failed historical experiments. These included the National Council of Sierra
Leone (NCSL), the People's National Party (PNP), the United Progressive Party (UPP)
and the Sierra Leone People's Independent Movement (SLPIM) in the 1950s and
early 1960s, as well as the National Democratic Party (NDP) in the early 1970s.
As a result, outside the membership of the two mainstream parties, most Sierra
Leoneans have felt excluded from the domestic political process that
independence was supposed to bestow upon them.
51. The Independence Constitution of 1961 made provisions for the conduct of
multi-party parliamentary elections every fifth year. Two other legal
instruments that bolstered the conduct of elections in the immediate
post-colonial period were the Franchise and Electoral Registration Act of 1961
and the Electoral Provisions Act of 1962. Section 37 of the independence
constitution established an electoral commission comprising a chief electoral
commissioner or chairman, plus between two and four other members to be
appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister. The
commission was classified not as an independent body but as a unit of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs; its administrative staffers were members of the
civil service seconded to the Commission through the Ministry. The Commission
also lacked a self-accounting status; the Ministry of Finance handled its
finances on its behalf.
52. Elections can be considered as three distinct time periods: the pre-election
period; polling day itself; and the immediate post-election period. Exclusionary
tactics were apparent in the pre-election period of the first post-colonial
general election,32 held in 1962. The SLPP under Sir Milton Margai
deployed the Chiefs against the opposition in Kono and many other parts of the
country by cleverly side-stepping the Electoral Provision Act 1962. This Act
formally debarred the Chiefs from interfering in political meetings, unless it
had become disorderly or appeared likely to lead to a breach of the peace.
However, the provision in question applied only during the official period of
election campaign and not before its announcement. SLPP Chiefs therefore acted
pre-emptively to stop the opposition from campaigning in their Chiefdoms.
53. The District Council Elections of 1962 saw an extension of anti-democratic
policies. Many APC supporters were charged before the Native Administration
Courts for "incitement undermining the authority of the Paramount Chiefs."33
The perceived mistreatment of these APC supporters would invoke hostility to a
number of Chiefs after they resumed power in 1968. Some APC members advocated
that the Chiefs should be suspended or dethroned as retribution for their
repressive actions during the Milton Margai years.
54. Sierra Leonean politics in the 1960s also began to be undermined by the
notion of the 'pa', a tag of quasi paternal authority attached to the perceived
'big man' of any given political grouping. In addition to its connotations of
deferential respect, the title of 'pa' has always brought with it
administrative, political and financial power over other members of the group or
party.34 In consequence it represents a personalisation of politics,
as was the case in the SLPP in the run-up to the 1962 elections.
55. The sitting SLPP Members of Parliament allocated the party symbol for
candidature to themselves, contrary to the rules agreed on in January 1962.35
This tactic prevented the selection of any candidates whose loyalty to the
leadership was not assured. Further pre-election manoeuvrings by the regime
also led to six SLPP candidates being returned completely unopposed.36
The Commission however found no evidence of attempts to rig the elections on
polling day, which was relatively peaceful and orderly.37
56. After his brother's death, Sir Albert Margai inherited a party that was
over-reliant on Chiefs and split internally over his controversial selection by
the Governor General to become Prime Minister in 1964. Sir Albert Margai
restricted the participatory process by obstructing opposition activities in
several ways. First he used the Public Order Act 1965, Section 24 abusively to
prevent the opposition from campaigning in the Provinces.38
Paramount Chiefs chased out known APC members from their Chiefdoms allegedly on
the instructions of the Prime Minister. Several Chiefs who appeared immune to
this type of manipulation were simply removed from power.39
57. Sir Albert Margai weakened the opposition inside Parliament by introducing
the 1965 Absenteeism Bill, which stipulated that any member who absented himself
for 30 days without reasonable excuse would forfeit his seat. Four APC Members
of Parliament lost their seats after they had been convicted and jailed for
riotous conduct. Thus Sir Albert hampered an important element of democratic
good governance by reducing the voice of the opposition in Parliament.
58. Another example of restricted political participation was the denial of the
opposition's right to be heard over the national radio station operated by the
Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS).
59. Sir Albert's ultimately vain attempt at creating a one-party state in Sierra
Leone was a further example of the inherently exclusionary political tendency
under his regime.40 He was only prevented from pursuing his plans by
massive and sustained opposition from civil society.
60. Yet the SLPP's lacking internal democracy manifested itself again in the way
Sir Albert Margai distributed party symbols during the 1967 general election
campaign. He is alleged to have given symbols only to those who pledged him
their unflinching support,41 thus alienating party members who
opposed his style of leadership. It was a classic case of personal interest
being placed above party and national interests, as it forced a number of
popular figures to stand as 'objectionist' independent candidates.42
61. The Prime Minister then allegedly instructed the civil servants who served
as returning officers in the Provinces to rig the 1967 elections.43
The Government had the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS) announce the
results over radio in such a manner as to appear as if the SLPP had won 32 seats
and the APC 32. In fact the APC had won 32 seats and the SLPP had managed only
28 seats. A prolonged and damaging standoff followed, descending into farce
when military officers hijacked the political process and a hastily convened
National Reformation Council (NRC) was anointed.44
62. The NRC junta was an aberration on the political scene. Having grabbed
political power through a coup, the regime lacked legitimacy, which could only
really be conferred on a regime through electoral success. The NRC was also
extremely reluctant to implement the outcome of the 1967 elections, despite
enormous popular pressure for the mass vote to be recognised. The regime
neither represented nor encouraged broad-based political participation.
63. The first APC government under Siaka Stevens began deviating from the canons
of free and fair elections and participatory politics almost immediately upon
assuming power. Stevens disregarded the agreement of national unity between his
party and the SLPP that had been set up in 1968 to heal a nation deeply divided
by the elections of 1967.45 He orchestrated a series of legal
challenges, which unseated 23 SLPP Members of Parliament and later his regime
instigated widespread violence against SLPP supporters in subsequent
by-elections between 1968 and 1970. The APC Government also proscribed a new
political party, the National Democratic Party, set up by some of Stevens' most
outspoken opponents in 1970.
64. The Electoral Commission was a highly compromised institution during the
regime of Siaka Stevens and was complicit in undermining the electoral process.
It turned a blind eye to the immense violence of the by-elections in 1969 and
1970 and endorsed obviously flawed victories for the APC. In the 1973 polls,
the Electoral Commission presided over numerous incidents in which SLPP
candidates were violently prevented from entering nomination centres to certify
their candidature, as was required by law. Thus by the close of the campaign on
24 March 1973, APC candidates were declared unopposed in 46 out of the 85
constituencies.46 The SLPP was to withdraw from these elections as a
result.47
65. The Electoral Commission became a dumping ground for the APC party
faithful. Its credibility suffered immensely in the eyes of a populace that saw
it as nothing but an agency of the ruling regime bent on maintaining it in power
through violent and coercive tactics.
66.
In 1977, widespread intimidation and thuggery again resulted in an election that
was neither free nor fair.48 APC candidates were unopposed in all
constituencies in the Bonthe, Koinadugu, Kambia, Tonkolili and Bombali
Districts.49 SLPP candidates in these areas were arrested under the
Public Emergency Act 1978 and detained.50
67. The most devastating blow to a free, fair and participatory political
process in Sierra Leone was the introduction of a one-party system of governance
in 1978. In turning the country into a One Party State, the Parliament ruled
that only members of the recognised party (the APC) could qualify for election
to the Presidency.51 Moreover, only members of that party in a
conference of national delegates were eligible to nominate a candidate for
presidential elections.52
68. The One-Party Constitution destroyed all constitutional pretences about an
independent Electoral Commission. Chapter IV of the new Constitution stated
that the Electoral Commission was to be appointed by the President and could be
deposed by the President for inability to discharge its duty or for
misbehaviour. The wide discretionary powers given the President in relation to
the Electoral Commission ensured that its members held office only at the
pleasure of the President and therefore could hardly perform their functions
without being overtly or covertly biased in favour of the President or his
preferred candidates. The notion of 'government candidate' took universal hold,
denoting a candidate with the President's support who would be elected as a
formality, whatever the preferences of voters.
69. Members of Parliament in 1978 had to join the APC party or face expulsion.
Despite this objectionable downturn in the governance of the country, there is
no indication that the 11 remaining SLPP MPs made any protest at the deliberate
robbing of the right to mass participation in the political process. The
opposition political elite instead proved that it would rather be included in
the one-party structure than stand up for the cardinal democratic right and
responsibility of the populace to chose candidates of its choice. The SLPP
politicians, like their APC counterparts, have always preferred individual
short-term survival over sound ideology, doctrines of principle or good
governance. Thus in 1978, the SLPP members abdicated their responsibilities to
challenge bad governance, their major focus instead switching to means of
reaping the loot of co-optation.
70. The challenge of effecting change was left in the hands of students and
marginalised youths. In its submission to the Commission, UNAMSIL directly
linked the emergence of this 'unofficial opposition' to the causes of the war:
"The institution of a One
Party system in 1978 and the suppression of freedom under that system suffocated
the growth of democracy and good governance. This suppression also nurtured the
rebellious attitude amongst the youth, making it easier for them to embrace
demagogues like Foday Sankoh who had promised to overthrow the system
violently."53
71. Exclusionary and violent electoral practices also
blighted the conduct of the 1982 elections, the first such exercise under the
One-Party Constitution. Many individuals who were distrusted or not favoured by
the APC central committee were either excluded from the process by non-issuance
of the party symbol, or looked on helplessly as their supporters were prevented
from voting. Such blatant attempts at exclusion inevitably generated violence.
Electoral violence occurred in Bombali between the supporters of Abdulai Timbo
(mainly Fullah) and Thaimu Bangura (mainly Temne),54 as well as in
Pujehun South, between supporters of Manna Kpaka and Solomon Demby. The
conflict between Kpaka's and Demby's supporters spawned what was referred to as
the 'Ndorgboryosoi', which is widely acknowledged as a forerunner of the
localised conflict that erupted there as part of the insurgency ten years later.55
In Kagboro Chiefdom in Moyamba District, intense violence was waged on opponents
by APC strongman, Harry T. T. Williams. In the Western Area, thuggery in the
West One constituency led to the cancellation of the elections.
72. An especially ominous development was the emergence of 'drugging' as a means
of preparing thugs to participate in electoral violence. The anti-democratic
actions of drug-using youths, manipulated by politicians, foreshadowed similar
practices in the conflict, often involving child combatants or forced recruits.56
73. The narrowing of the participatory process did not end with the transfer of
power from Siaka Stevens to his APC successor President J. S. Momoh in 1985.
Indeed, the succession itself epitomised many of the deficiencies in the wider
political process. Within the APC party structure, dubious means were adopted
to exclude the former First Vice-President S. I. Koroma, who believed that he
ought to have succeeded Siaka Stevens.57 The party selection process
contrived to present General J. S. Momoh, the Head of the Army, as the sole
candidate of the party for the presidential elections.58
74. Since the Momoh regime was in many respects a continuation of Siaka Stevens'
rule, the APC party's contempt for internal democracy was very much evident.
Under Momoh, however, a small circle of members of the President's ethnic group
- Limba - came to dominate decision-making processes. As well as being Limba,
all the most important individuals were alleged to belong to the tribalistic
Ekutay society.59
75. Local government elections were never conducted under Momoh, thus continuing
the exclusionary political trend he inherited from Siaka Stevens.
76. To Momoh's credit, however, there were some improvements in electoral
administration. The Electoral Commission conducted the 1986 elections in a
relatively free and fair manner, devoid of violence. Shortly after those
elections, the appointment of Max Bailor as Chairman of the Electoral Commission
led to changes in its administration that improved its capacity to conduct
elections. University graduates were recruited, a far cry from the usually
poorly educated officers who staffed the neglected professional wing of the
Commission. Amendments made to the voting methods in 1990 saw the
reintroduction of ballot papers and a single box for candidates to replace the
much abused marbles or tokens put separately in different boxes for each
candidate. A process of computerisation of voters' registration was also
begun. Thus the electoral commission was able effectively to conduct a
referendum that approved the reintroduction of the multi-party system in 1991.
77. Unfortunately these incremental improvements were all too little too late.
The upturn in participatory mechanisms coincided with the start of the conflict
in 1991. Unsurprisingly a conspiracy theory emerged to question the veracity of
Momoh's democratic credentials. It was alleged that instead of accelerating a
return to democracy, his government wished to use the war as a pretext to delay
multi-party elections, or to hold elections only in secure areas of the country
where the APC enjoyed strong support.60
THE RULE OF LAW
78. The rule of law signifies a society in which law is supreme. The running of
state institutions, the relationship between the rulers and the ruled,
interactions amongst and between individuals or corporate bodies; they should
all be done according to law. The rule of law opposes the arbitrary rule of
powerful men and women. The basic principles of the rule of law include
equality before the law of the land;61 an impartial and independent
judiciary; an accessible justice system; irrevocable constitutional guarantees;
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.62 Other
important components of the rule of law are due process and fair legislative
mechanisms that do not discriminate against particular groups in the society.
79. Citizenship provisions in the 1961 Constitution discriminated against Sierra
Leonean women in many important respects. The most telling unfairness was that
whilst the provision automatically granted citizenship to descendants of male
Sierra Leoneans, it denied citizenship to the offspring of female Sierra
Leoneans where the father was not of African Negro descent. The citizenship
provisions also excluded the Lebanese, a long-standing and important community
in Sierra Leone, from becoming citizens. The discrimination against them was
racial - they were not of African Negro descent.
80. In 1906, the laws created to govern land tenure discriminated on grounds of
ethnicity. Different land laws were applied to Sierra Leoneans depending on
whether they were "natives" (those originating from the Provinces) or so-called
"non-natives" (those originating from the Colony of Freetown, who were
predominantly Krios). "Natives" could hold an indefinite interest in land in
the Provincial areas but "non-natives" could only acquire land and hold it on
limited tenancy. The Provincial Land Act of 1906 stated that "no non-native
shall acquire a greater interest in land in the Provinces than a tenancy for
fifty years." The same statute contained the further clause that "nothing in
this Section shall prevent the insertion in any lease of a clause providing for
the renewal of such lease for a second or further terms not over twenty one
years."63
81. The Provincial Land Act of 1906 gave certain advantages and privileges to
the Protectorate people by reason of their place of birth or origin, which were
not extended to other Sierra Leoneans. The Chiefs could arbitrarily recover
land sold to "non-natives" if they so desired, especially if the land was
formerly communally owned. In this area, the rule of law was subverted.
82. Most Sierra Leoneans also lacked access to the superior courts of the land,
which were located in Freetown. The English common law applied in these courts
was not understood by ordinary Sierra Leoneans, the majority of whom were
illiterates from the Provinces who could not speak English. The courts were
administered mainly by people belonging to one ethnic group - Krio. Thus even
members of other ethnic groups who resided in Freetown avoided these courts.
They preferred courts based on the traditional system of customary law, which
were set up especially by Tribal Headmen in Freetown and its environs. The
ordinance establishing Tribal Headship in the Western Area made no provision for
the establishment of these courts. They were therefore illegal.
83. As magistrate courts were not established in the Provinces until 1965,
provincial inhabitants only had access to local courts run according to custom,
which varied from Chiefdom to Chiefdom. Customary law was not codified, no was
there any uniformity of procedure or penalty. The room for arbitrariness was
therefore too large.
84. Arguably the high point of Sir Albert Margai's regime in terms of rule of
law was the passage of the Courts Act of 1965, which created magistrate courts
that could be accessed directly by inhabitants of the Provinces. However, the
Criminal Procedure Act of 1965 lacked acceptable safeguards to protect criminal
defendants and was littered with anachronistic provisions. In particular,
judges and magistrates were afforded an undue degree of discretion, inviting
arbitrariness and abuse of their discretionary powers.
85. Many provisions in the Public Order Act of 1965 undermined basic rights.
Provisions relating to seditious libel and the grossly arbitrary powers of the
government during a state of emergency were typical examples.64
Other measures that clearly undermined the tenets of the rule of law included
giving control of public meetings in the Provinces to the Chiefs, which many
Chiefs used in practice to ban APC meetings.
86. The APC under Siaka Stevens pursued the demolition of the rule of law to new
and very violent levels. Stevens quickly declared a state of emergency using
the deficient regime of the Public Order Act. Whilst Albert Margai had usually
been hesitant in implementing some of the unfair laws passed by his regime to
their full effect, Stevens became adept at utilising many of those laws in new
and unimaginable ways. The Steven's regime promulgated its state of emergency
during the by-elections of 1969-70 and under its cover unleashed the army and
police against the opposition SLPP.
87. The state of emergency met with clamorous political dissent. Yet
ironically, the more its opponents protested, the more the screws of its legal
mechanisms were tightened. Notably the vocal and burgeoning National Democratic
Party (NDP) of Dr. John Karefa-Smart was banned outright. Another instance of
misuse of emergency powers came in 1977, after students demonstrated against
President Stevens at a graduation ceremony at Fourah Bay College. The security
forces intervened with brutal effect, firing live ammunition on the crowd. In
1978-79, in the face of mounting labour unrest and a threatened nation-wide
strike, President Stevens again used emergency powers to clamp down on union
leaders.
88. In the 1973 elections, APC thugs were hired by the
APC specifically to operate above the law in kidnapping SLPP candidates until
after nominations of candidates were closed. Laws passed during Sir Albert
Margai's rule required candidates to be present at the nomination grounds on
nomination day.65 Thus the involuntary absence of SLPP candidates in
effect meant that APC candidates were returned unopposed in a majority of
constituencies.
89. The APC government's failure to implement laws like the Non-citizenship
Trade and Business Act of 1969 (meant to empower indigenous Sierra Leonean
business people by excluding foreigners from certain sectors of the economy)
convinced a lot of persons that it was not a government that cared about the
law. Rather than assessing laws on their merits, most people believed that the
government only did things according to the wishes of the highest bidders.66
90. As the rule of law diminished, judgements in court cases were often decided
on grounds other than those justified by law. Unethical practices were rampant
among lawyers. It became common for lawyers to solicit bribes from their
clients for judges, magistrates and court officials. Barristers and solicitors
colluded with their clients to pervert the course of justice. Litigation
proceedings were often reduced to a snail's pace with the deliberate concurrence
of the lawyers involved.
91. The legal profession contributed a great deal towards the massive abuse of
human rights that took place before and during the war. Indeed the lawyers of
today are just as responsible for the woeful state of human rights protection
that persists in the country. It was not uncommon during the 1970s and 80s for
members of the Sierra Leone Bar Association to act as spies for the regime of
President Siaka Stevens. Barristers leaked decisions by the Bar Association to
government, thereby forestalling planned protests against oppressive and
unconstitutional government actions.
92. Law reporting was neglected during the regime of Siaka Stevens. Between
1920 and 1973, regular editions of the African Law Report (Sierra Leone Series)
had been published. The reporting of judgements of the courts of Sierra Leone
was abruptly halted without proper explanation in 1973. One direct consequence
of this decision was the upsurge in inconsistencies in subsequent judgements.
These inconsistencies have left many decorated lawyers, not to mention the
general population, utterly confused as to what really constitutes the laws of
Sierra Leone. From the time of Stevens to the present day, the country has been
denied an efficient system of recording and reporting the judgements of the
courts.
93. Of equal concern has been the static nature of the laws of Sierra Leone.
Without law reforms and revisions, the rule of law is gradually compromised
because new challenges facing the state are not addressed satisfactorily.
Although the APC government established a Law Reform Commission in 1975,67
it did not treat the commission with any respect or seriousness. Thus the
country was left with laws that were outdated68 and largely
irrelevant to the demands of development, growth and multi-faceted integration.
94. Local court officials lacked legal training. The Local Courts Act No. 20 of
1963 provided for their work to be supervised by judicial advisers or customary
law officers. These officers were empowered to advise local courts in matters
of law, train local court personnel and exercise judicial review over decisions
of local courts. However, declining interest in the rule of law and poor
conditions of service meant that few such customary law officers were
appointed. Local courts' personnel continued to act as they wished without heed
to the integrity or the improvement of the law. Customary law was never
codified.
95. There were no marked changes in the rule of law situation during the regime
of Siaka Stevens' successor, President Joseph Saidu Momoh. Though perceptibly
less violent overall than the Stevens regime, the Momoh regime nonetheless
hanged its own First Vice-President, Francis Minah, after he was implicated in
an improbable coup. Minah was almost certainly a victim of political vendetta
within the APC, but a compromised judiciary was not likely to acquit him of
treason in a climate where political favours mattered more than legal
justifications. Minah was convicted and condemned to death with a number of
other party outcasts.
96. Momoh's reign elevated members of a tribalistic clique within the APC party,
known as Ekutay, to a position well above the ordinary laws of the land. As the
economic situation worsened, the regime carried the promulgation of states of
emergencies yet another step further by declaring a state of economic
emergency. State officials used emergency as a pretext to seize people's money
and property without regard for the law. The economic state of emergency was
itself a suspension of the rule of law and fundamental rights. Allegedly
looking for 'economic saboteurs,' state officials invaded private homes,
disrupted businesses and generally created a climate of economic mayhem.
THE MEDIA
97. At independence, Sierra Leone enjoyed a vibrant media tradition, which
included the first newspapers, radio broadcasters and television stations in
sub-Saharan Africa. The governments of the post-independence era were
theoretically in an excellent position to consolidate the country's proud
heritage.
98. During the colonial period, newspapers like the West African Reporter (1876
- 1884) and the Sierra Leone Weekly News (1886 - 1951) had not only criticised
the colonial authorities, but also created awareness about issues of common
concern such as education, health and agriculture.69 During Sir
Milton Margai's three-year tenure, there was no deliberate attempt to gag the
press by the regime.70 There was pluralism in relation to the print
media, albeit that the government controlled the only radio and television
stations, as was the case in many parts of the world in that era.
99. Sir Albert Margai introduced laws to curtail press freedom, however. For
example, a directive was issued to the government-owned newspaper, 'The Daily
Mail', and the state broadcasting agency, the SLBS, not to afford any publicity
to APC activities. When the government lost a libel case against the
APC-leaning 'We Yone' newspaper for attempting to expose corruption at
the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB), the regime removed juries from
seditious libel cases and introduced trial by judge alone.71
Journalists such as Ibrahim Bash Taqi, A. F. Thorlu Bangura, and Samuel Holist,
who exposed corruption at the SLPMB through We Yone, were constantly
harassed. A. F. Thorlu Bangura, who was the newspaper's financial controller,
was sentenced to a year in jail for defamatory libel of the Prime Minister. The
Public Order Act 1965 criminalised defamatory libel and set the tone for
suppression of the press by successive regimes up to the present day.
100. The Media was considerably suppressed under the NRC, despite its short
tenure in power. The junta passed a decree which "forbade publication of any
mention of the overthrown SLPP regime, the opposition APC or any defamatory
matter concerning the NRC or its individual members or any statement likely to
stir up ill-will between the ethnic groups in the country."72 The
press subjected itself to extreme censorship as a result.
101. The Siaka Stevens regime orchestrated violent attacks against the
independent press. One of the reasons Dr. Mohamed Sorie Forna gave for his
resignation as APC Finance Minister in 1970 was the looting and burning down of
the offices of 'Freedom Press', during which a child was killed. In 1972, the
opposition newspaper, 'The People' was ransacked; in March 1973, following
threats to journalists by the President, the editor of the opposition 'Unity'
newspaper was detained without trial. Within five years the press was
thoroughly cowed through threats, detentions and violent attacks on their
premises. Those left alone were largely those that had metamorphosed into
propaganda machines for the APC. Newspapers like 'We Yone', the 'Sierra Leone
Daily Mail', 'The Nation' and 'Sunday Flash' became mouthpieces for the APC
triumvirate of Siaka Stevens, S.I. Koroma and CA Kamara-Taylor.
102. A government news organ, the Sierra Leone News Agency (SLENA), was
established in 1980 to clear all news items and other issues pertaining to the
OAU conference. After the conference, the government agreed to a neutrality
clause as a condition for continuous funding to SLENA from UNESCO and PANA (Pan
African News Agency). The government steadily diverged from the ethos of this
clause, however, and SLENA became another agency for government misinformation.73
103. Radio and television broadcasting were monopolised by the
tightly-controlled SLBS. There has never been a Freedom of Information Act in
Sierra Leone and its absence allowed for much speculative journalism. People's
freedom of speech was severely restricted by the tendency of the security forces
to arrest people for what was known as 'careless talk' - essentially
any criticism of the government. Newspapers that reported corruption or human
rights violations were invariably admonished or attacked.74 In 1982,
state security agents bombed the offices and printing facilities of the
independent newspaper 'The Tablet'. The publisher, editors, and senior
journalists fled into exile.
104. In 1980, Parliament passed the Newspaper Amendment Act, which increased the
cost of newspaper registration to exorbitant levels. The Minister of
Information received and approved all applications and also had the right to
refuse registration.
105. President Momoh inherited a regime hostile towards press freedom. The
government-controlled broadcast media retained the same monopoly over the
dissemination of information. During Momoh's reign, the coverage of the SLBS
was restricted to Freetown. Thus when the conflict broke out in 1991, the
majority of Sierra Leoneans relied on rumour to determine its progress. The
SLBS effectively promoted the government's version of the war until junior
officers from the war front descended upon Freetown to overthrow the regime in
April 1992. A culture of misinformation laid the foundation for gossip and
popular myth to dominate people's impressions of the conflict - a phenomenon
known as the 'den say' syndrome. Incongruously, Sierra Leoneans were
over-reliant on the BBC World Service to keep up-to-date with events in their
own country. Moreover, the dearth of accurate reporting contributed to
propaganda successes on the part of the insurgent RUF,75 driving
large numbers of people away from their villages in panic even when the threat
of attack was in reality very distant.
106. The continued attacks on the media drove many qualified and experienced
people away from the profession, decimating the calibre and capacity of the
so-called 'Fourth Estate'. Nowadays, anyone with a secondary school leaving
certificate could practice as a journalist. Many of the media houses, in
particular print media, are owned by people who wear their political loyalties
on their sleeves. Many of the newspapers have degenerated into political rags.
107. A culture of debate and principled reporting still remains unattainable for
most media practitioners in Sierra Leone. In consequence the average Sierra
Leonean has no confidence in the media, either for newsworthy stories or
informed, objective editorial opinion. The poor financial state of most of the
media houses implies that the journalists are only paid a pittance. Many
journalists are therefore inclined to practice blackmail, whereby people about
whom they have received unsavoury information are 'compelled' to pay them to
prevent the information from being published. Public figures who have attempted
to call the journalists' bluff are rewarded with sustained negative press
reporting. In order to protect their reputations, many people embark on
criminal prosecutions for defamation against the erring journalists. Thus both
press and public are ensnared in a vicious circle, which is all too often
squared by the intervention of the ruling party.
108. The Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ) needs to clean its house
out in order to retrieve the reputation of journalism from its detractors intent
on dragging it through the mud. SLAJ must clarify the criteria for admission to
practise as a journalist. Only a small number of newspapers still remain true
to the ideals of the profession. All other media practitioners must try to
build upon the example these newspapers set and redeem the status of the media
as valuable, regulated space for dialogue between all sectors, institutions and
individuals in society.
CIVIL SOCIETY
109. Civil Society in the colonial era was mainly composed of elitist
Freetown-based groups active in pressuring the colonial authorities to open up
the political space between 1920 and 1947. By 1950, these groups had coalesced
to form a political party - The National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone
(NCCSL) - dedicated to promoting the interests of the Krio ethnic group in the
accelerated decolonisation process of the 1950s.
110. The two major civil society groups in the former Protectorate, the Sierra
Leone Organisation Society (SOS) and the Protectorate Educational and
Progressive Union (PEPU), also merged into a political party. It was the
beginning of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), established ostensibly to
promote the interests of people in the provincial areas.
111. The NCCSL was not successful in reaching its objectives and the rancour at
having lost out to the political thrust of Protectorate civil society, embodied
in the SLPP, had still not evaporated by independence in 1961. The NCCSL's
enmity found new expression in the alliance forged between its constituent
groups and the APC. The latter had grown out of splits within the ranks of the
Protectorate representatives in the run-up to independence. The APC mainly
represented one particular social category (people without ties to traditional
rulers) and one Region of the country (the North). Like the Krios, however,
its members felt marginalised by the emerging dominance of the political scene
by people from the South and those with strong ties to the Chiefs.
112. The support given by members of the Krio-dominated civil society in
Freetown to the organisers of the 1955 riots76 foreshadowed their
readiness in subsequent years to support any strong engagement with Protectorate
elite as represented by the SLPP. The organisers of the strike, the Artisanal
and Allied Workers led by Marcus Grant, were agitating for an increase in
salaries and improvement in working conditions. It was alleged that the leader
of the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone (NCCSL) instigated the
riot as a last-ditch effort to undermine the inevitable dominance of the SLPP in
the post-colonial period.77 Sir Milton Margai refused to talk to the
workers and instead suppressed the riot after violent days, during which much
destruction was done. Several strikers were killed and property belonging to
some prominent cabinet ministers was destroyed.78 This clash set the
tone for a difficult relationship between workers and the ruling elite.
Workers' demands were generally met with intransigence and force by the state.
113. Notwithstanding the Elections Before Independence Movement (EBIM),79
which later spawned the APC, there were to be no further confrontations between
civil society and the Milton Margai regime. Civil society was largely bereft of
a flagship issue with which to engage passionately between 1961 and 1964.
114. The situation was quite different during Sir Albert Margai's tenure between
1964 and 1967. Freetown civil society discovered in Albert Margai's overbearing
political tendencies reasons to be afraid that their future was under threat.
Thus Freetown-based civic groups like the Fourah Bay Academic Staff and
Students' organisations, the Sierra Leone Bar Association and the independent
press actively engaged the regime on issues such as the proposed one-party
state, harassment of the media and the introduction of a republican
constitution. Civil society also challenged the regime on its alleged
corruption and its appointment of mostly Southerners to public positions.
115. Civil society groups found a real focus, however, in their loathing of the
NRC junta's attempts to perpetuate itself in power. Despite the regime's
attempts at co-opting key members of civil society by appointing them into the
Civilian Advisory Committee, the latter recommended a swift handover of power to
civilians. Eventually junior military officers overthrew the NRC and set up the
Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Council, which handed over power to a civilian
government headed by the APC.
116. The return to civilian rule was basically a victory for the
Freetown-dominated civil society groups, most of which were in reality aligned
to the APC. These groups proceeded weakly to oblige the APC by turning a blind
eye to the party's increasingly autocratic practices.
117. That civil society failed to challenge the APC's brutal electoral practices
in the by-elections of 1969-70 and the obviously doubtful legality of its
proclamation of a republic in 1971 was symptomatic of a narrow-minded ethnic and
professional fear of the SLPP political alternative. Civil society leaders were
largely opportunistic and they saw in co-optation by the APC a better route to
keeping their privileged positions that had been threatened under the SLPP.80
118. Even the Sierra Leone Bar Association, arguably the civil society group
with the strongest potential voice, failed to stand up to the dictatorship of
Siaka Stevens. Their meek submission to the One-Party Constitution in 1978 was
a far cry from their vibrant protestations at the Albert Margai one-party
initiative. In his submission to the Commission, a respected member of the Bar
Association at that time lamented thus:
"We the people of this
country must accept some of the blame, because we did not challenge the
government then, as has been done in Ghana and Nigeria. We the middle class,
the professionals and intellectuals failed the people of this country, because
when similar circumstances arose in Ghana and Nigeria, we would see the Ghanaian
middle class or Nigerian middle class and intellectuals and professionals take
to the streets! Unlike us, they went the course, they were prepared to go to
prison, they were prepare to die!"81
119. Other groups within civil society lacked the
financial or intellectual clout of the bar association and the academic staff
association to mount a credible challenge to the APC. Other factors also
contributed to their disinterest in engaging the APC in the early 1970s. First
living standards had not yet deteriorated. Second the leaders of the unions
shared ethnic ties with the leaders of the APC and were reluctant to act against
the party.
120. However the foremost deterrent to opponents of the deteriorating governance
situation lay in the violent methodologies deployed by the APC to crush dissent.
Members of police units, the Special Security Division (SSD) and hired youths or
thugs meted out brutality sanctioned by the state. In his submission to the
commission, the Ombudsman stated:
"The SSD was the instrument
of tyranny in this country. It was used to cow opposition leaders; it was used
to cow the press, the citizens, students and people who tried to protest; It was
used for killing people, maiming and to some extent armed robbery. But
everybody kept silent because of the fact that we were scared that they could
seek their revenge."82
121. The government's ability to co-opt civil society
leaders was markedly enhanced by the One-Party Constitution 1978 which in
Chapter IV, Section 43 empowered the President to appoint seven members to
Parliament by instrument under his own hand. Consequently, the Presidents of
the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and the Sierra Leone Labour Congress
were appointed as Members of Parliament. Also, key members of the Academic
Staff Association were co-opted and given ambassadorial posts or made ministers.
122. Student bodies, in which leadership was necessarily transient, were left as
the only organised civil society. Their youth worked in their favour, since the
government did not consider it worth co-opting them and they were bold enough
not to back off from confronting the regime. However, the brutal suppression of
the nation-wide students' demonstrations of 1977 muted student protest for a
considerable period of time.
123. In 1982, deteriorating living conditions led to a regime-threatening strike
organised by the Sierra Leone Labour Congress. The strike action was violently
crushed in a manner that confirmed the government's willingness to take extreme
measures to preserve its position. Thus was extinguished the last major
flourish of civil society in highlighting either the political or economic
deterioration of the country during the Siaka Steven era.
124. Upon assuming office in 1985, President Momoh met a virtually lifeless
civil society. Though a military man and an obviously incompetent
administrator, the new president was not overtly violent, so civil society
actors started to raise their voices. A group of parliamentarians formed the
Backbenchers' Association and they were complimented by such newspapers as the
'New Shaft' and 'For di People' in their call for an opening up of political
discourse.
125. There were, however, members of President Momoh's administration who were
prepared to unleash violence on opponents of the regime. The leader of this
violent clique was the Inspector General of Police, Bambay Kamara. The
President lacked the authority to shackle such men; thus the APC in its last
days swung between violence on the one hand and, on the other, the more subtle
interventions of intellectuals like Dr. Abdulai O Conteh, the Attorney General
and Minister of Justice. Conteh was to lead the APC's thrust to become a
multi-party constitutional regime. A new constitution was promulgated, but the
untamed men of violence were allegedly planning to brutally rig the multi-party
elections when war broke out.
126. The role of faith institutions in the period leading to the war also
demands examination. It is indeed regrettable that faith institutions seem to
have found common cause with the governments of the day and therefore took no
stand on the issues that were tearing the country apart between 1961 and 1991.
Faith institutions were content to be feted and revered by the respective
Governments. They did not use the access this reverence conferred on them to
engage in dialogue with the rulers and try to have them change their oppressive
politics.
127. In this sense, the church men and imams were no different from their
colonial forebears who encouraged the people to read their Bibles and Korans
while their land and other resources were appropriated by the colonial
government. The religious institutions have engaged the Government only once in
public, when in 1993 an officer of the NPRC regime, Colonel Gabriel Mani,
assaulted a notable religious figurehead, Bishop Keillie of Bo Diocese. Up to
1991 therefore, faith institutions in Sierra Leone buried their heads in the
sand and intoned that everything was fine in the country, admonishing the
faithful through their sermons to be loyal to constituted authority.
128. It took until the final throes of the conflict for the attitude of faith
institutions to change in any significant way. One factor that accounted for
the improvement was the establishment of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra
Leone (IRC/SL) in 1997. For the first time, an umbrella organisation that
brought the leadership of all the faith institutions together was established.
It became common for them to articulate unified positions on the burning issues
of the day and to engage the unpopular junta government of the AFRC from a
position of strength. Gradually the faith institutions were to play an
important role in efforts at bringing peace, beginning with the Conakry Peace
Plan and leading up to the Lomé Peace Agreement. Today, the churches and
mosques are engaged in consolidating the peace through their work at community
level, reintegrating and reconciling their followers whilst attempting to meet
their developmental needs.
SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN SIERRA LEONE
The Sierra Leone Army
129. The Sierra Leone Army at the time of independence was small and confined to
the barracks. There were only four barracks, positioned at Daru in the Kailahun
District, and at Wilberforce, Juba and Murray Town in Freetown.
130. When the British colonial authorities created the Sierra Leone Army, they
used dual criteria for recruitment.83 In the South and East, where
more people had undergone western type education,84 there was an
insistence on educational qualifications. This requirement coupled with the fact
that seven of the country's 12 districts were in the South and the East led to a
preponderance of Southerners and Easterners in the officer corps of the Army in
the immediate post-colonial period.85
131. In the North, a different criterion was used. Fitness and height were
emphasised and educational qualifications were played down. Many Korankos,
albeit uneducated because of the lack of western type educational facilities in
their region, met these conditions. They were recruited in large numbers into
the lower ranks. Some members of the other major ethnic groups in the North -
the Temnes and the Limbas - also established themselves in the Army in this
manner.
132. The Army inherited by Sir Milton Margai was therefore ethnically
unbalanced. There were few Northerners in the officer corps, yet they were
over-represented in the lower ranks. Upward mobility was limited, as a formal
education and passing of professional examinations were standard requirements
for promotion to the officer corps.
133. Terms of recruitment for soldiers included free medical and surgical
services for their immediate families,86 a salary commensurate to the
cost of living, an annual leave allowance, adequate travelling allowances,
promotion through fair examinations, provision for overseas training and
security of tenure for all serving officers. Arbitrary removal was deliberately
rendered difficult by the Constitution.87
134. However, on the negative side, the space in the barracks was too small to
house many soldiers' families. Unhygienic bucket toilets were prevalent in
almost all the barracks in the city of Freetown - a condition that has not
changed up to the time of writing in 2004. Inadequate accommodation in the
barracks led to many low-ranking soldiers moving outside the barracks and
becoming much more susceptible to party politics right up to the time of the
conflict.
135. Sir Albert Margai inherited a neutral, non-politicised Army headed by
British Officers. The Commission found no evidence that the conditions of
service in the Army deteriorated during Sir Albert's regime. However, the
regime's 'Africanisation' of the force resulted in a lot of meddling in the
hierarchies and inter-relationships between soldiers. The rapid promotion of
Brigadier David Lansana, a compatriot of Sir Albert's from the East who was
closely affiliated to the Mende tribe, did not go down well with members of the
officer corps from other ethnic groups. In his submission to the Commission, a
member of the Army at the time, Major (Rtd.) Abu Noah stated:
"The fruit of such political
largesse was given [to Lansana], I say, because he had not merited [such a rank]
outside of the unnecessary need for Africanisation. It appeared then as if the
programme were designed to put the most senior Sierra Leonean Officer in a
position of trust as political insurance for the politician who introduced the
scheme. In 1964, for example, the speech of the Governor General lauded the
elevation of Lieutenant Colonel Lansana to the substantive rank of a Colonel and
in 1965 he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier. Those where the salad days of
Sir Albert Margai's reign."88
136. When in 1967 the Deputy Head of the Army, John
Bangura, and six other Northerners and Krios were arrested for an alleged coup
plot, it left mainly Mende officers in the senior cadre. Of the seventeen
cadets recruited in 1967, thirteen were Mendes.89
137. The promotions that Sir Albert Margai effected and the overall domination
of the officer corps by members of his Mende ethnic group paved the way for the
Army's political intervention in 1967. Disputes and depositions by members of
the Army, rather than politicians, would eventually lead to the installation of
the country's first military regime, known as the National Reformation Council
(NRC).90
138. The NRC appointed the Head of the Police, William Leigh, as deputy chairman
of their ruling council. This appointment represented the beginning of the
politicisation of the Police Force, ironically instigated by the Army. Members
of the NRC then promoted themselves to ranks that they did not merit. For
example Colonel A. T. Juxon-Smith, the audacious Head of State, promoted himself
to Brigadier. The actions of the NRC formed a blueprint for subsequent military
regimes to distort ranks in the military by giving themselves unmerited
promotions.91 The officer corps was still dominated by Mendes under
the NRC, however.92
139. Siaka Stevens ultimately came to power as a result of another military coup
in 1968, which handed over power to Stevens on the basis that he was the
rightful winner of the 1967 General Election. The Army was an unstable
institution by the time Stevens took up office. Sir Albert Margai's policies
had driven a wedge down the middle of the Army and the growing rift had become
irreversible by the time Stevens took over.
140. Stevens accelerated political interference in the military, enacting a
variety of policies that decimated its worth to the state, including the
following:
- When Brigadier Bangura was Head of the Army, a
system referred to as "Tribal Returns" was introduced. All ranks were
accordingly re-examined in terms of their tribal composition. Ranks
containing large numbers of Mendes, whether duly qualified or not, were
reduced in number by the removal of members of this ethnic group. Thus many
Southerners and Easterners were dismissed from the Army arbitrarily with an
accompanying note stating simply "Service no longer required."93
- Conversely, all those soldiers who had been
declared redundant by Juxon Smith for abandoning the Army to join APC
loyalists for training in Guinea were re-enlisted under a policy called
'AWOL Recall'. These returning soldiers, most of them Northerners, were
given the positions that had become vacant as a result of the "Tribal
Returns Policy".
- So-called 'Specific Special Recruitment' was
carried out between 1968 and 1969 to target Northerners. The benchmark set
for such recruitment was the ability to lift a bag of rice over one's head.
Such a baseless method of enlistment sapped the sense of professionalism
from service and promotion in the Army, a trend that was never corrected in
the decades preceding the conflict.
141. The APC regime deployed the Army against its political opponents. AMIPOL,
a combined unit of the Army and the police force apparently set up to curb armed
robberies, was used to put down supporters of the rival United Democratic Party
(UDP). In addition, a new security agency - the Internal Security Unit (ISU) -
accountable only to Siaka Stevens and the APC was created to serve as a check on
the military whose loyalty the APC still doubted.94 Finally, the APC
deliberately starved the military of supplies. An under-equipped Army would be
no match for the generous firepower of the ISU in case of any attempt by the
soldiers to once again take over the running of the state.
142. Senior officers quickly began to share in the spoils of corruption under
the APC. For instance, senior officers were given 25,000 bags of rice per month
to distribute to soldiers, even though the total number of members of the
institution was less than 4,000.95 Finances allocated to the Army
were not audited. The recruitment process also accommodated 'favours' to
powerful members of the regime. Recruitment cards were given to party bosses to
enlist whosoever they wanted into the Army.
143. In 1978, the Army lost all semblance of political neutrality when the Head
of the Military, Colonel Joseph Saidu Momoh, was appointed to a simultaneous
seat in Parliament and made Minister of State. Momoh's extraordinary move was
made possible by a tailor-made provision in the One-Party Constitution 1978.
144. The APC put forward the following justification as the basis for its
policies on security institutions:
"Since the APC was returned
to power after the SLPP-led military interregnum in 1968, the ever-present
threat to remove the party from office by force of arms forced successive APC
governments into a self-defence and state defence posture. In the process,
internal security and stability assumed a very prominent place on the government
agenda, thus slowing down the full impact of our development strategies."96
145. Under President J.S. Momoh, the same patrimonial
system, the same Northern dominance, the same card system and the same corrupt
rice policy were continued. The policy of stifling the resources available to
the Army also continued. Thus the military, under-equipped,97
under-trained and with a leadership engrossed in chasing ill-gotten gains, was
most ill-prepared to meet the challenge of defending the country at the start of
the war in 1991.98
The Sierra Leone Police Force
146. There is no evidence that Sir Milton Margai tried to manipulate the Sierra
Leone Police force (SLP) based on partisan interests. The Police was largely
under the control of British Officers for the transitional period around the
country's independence.
147. Similarly, there was no widespread use of the Police force to suppress
popular opposition during Sir Albert Margai's tenure. The only recorded attempt
to deploy the police in this manner arose during the 1967 elections when the
Prime Minister was alleged to have instructed the police officers not to grant
police protection for opposition party meetings in the Provinces except where
such authorisation came directly from the District Officer. The District
Officers invariably refused to grant such permission, so Sir Albert's
instruction amounted to a prohibition. However, in cases where some officers
initially provided protection at opposition meetings, there is no evidence that
they were sacked, demoted or transferred by the Prime Minister.
148. The Police was first brought into politics when its head, Commissioner
William Leigh, was appointed deputy leader of the NRC regime in 1967. Mr. Alpha
Kamara, Assistant Commissioner of Police, also served as a member of the NRC's
Military Council.
149. Substantial political interference in police affairs took place during
Siaka Stevens' regime. Furthermore, the police became so incapacitated that it
struggled to provide even the most basic of services to the general populace.
150. The APC regime recruited party activists to form the nucleus of a
paramilitary wing of the police, the Internal Security Unit (ISU).99
Members of the rank and file of the ISU were mostly illiterates, drawn primarily
from the Limba ethnic group. Their loyalty to the APC and Siaka Stevens was
unflinching. They were deployed at key government locations and were very
ruthless in suppressing political opposition. They wielded considerable
political influence and some of them enjoyed accelerated promotions. The ISU
was disloyal to Police Headquarters as its officers considered themselves as
political appointees. The presence and the operational approach of the ISU
greatly undermined the cohesiveness of the Sierra Leone Police.
151. Political interference adversely affected relationships between those
officers with high political profiles and those with none. The latter group,
probably out of frustration, made no meaningful effort at improving the force,
while the former concentrated on improving their own lot. Between 1970 and
1985, this divided force became increasingly incompetent and corrupt. Without
security of tenure, the police tried constantly to please their political
patrons. Recruitment, promotion and dismissal of police officers were all
decided on arbitrary and secret grounds. Thus the SLP was shaped into a force
that acted as a ready tool in the perpetration of state terror against
dissenters and political opponents.
152. Large-scale corruption by Police Officers due to poor remuneration and
conditions of service led to the exploitation of the very people they were
supposed to protect. Deviant behaviour by police officers in turn created
disdain on the part of the public towards the SLP.
153. The heavy-handed means and tyrannical attitudes of most senior officers
towards their juniors also served to heighten tensions in the force. Junior
officers were routinely bullied and had their rice rations, salaries and other
entitlements seized unlawfully. Some dependants of these junior officers would
later graduate into the force and swell the ranks of rebellion.
154. This appalling situation was further compounded by the unprofessional
behaviour of police officers in handling and investigating reports made by the
public, which remained their core function. There was widespread extortion of
complainants, taking of sides in disputes and daily violation of basic human
rights, especially those of suspects. The violations included unlawful
incarceration, brutal torture in order to extract 'confessions,' violent
suppression of anti-government demonstrations and the lethargic failure of
senior officers to investigate complaints made against the police. All these
factors served to widen the already existing gulf between the public and the
police.
155. In 1978, the Police Force was further politicised under the One-Party
Constitution when its head was appointed by the President to be a Member of
Parliament. This destroyed the institutional autonomy of the police, just as
the Army had been robbed of its own. When he acceded to the Presidency in 1985,
the Head of the Army J. S. Momoh made no tangible effort to restore the
reputation of the Sierra Leone Police Force as an effective, non-partisan
protector and promoter of people's lives, property and dignity.
SERVICE DELIVERY
156. Governance balances the right to rule with the responsibility to deliver
services that enhance, rather than retard, people's basic material
requirements. Service delivery is dependent on the available natural and human
resources, the willingness of the governing regime to use these resources to
enhance economic viability and a distribution mechanism that caters for
vulnerable groups like youths, workers, women, children and rural dwellers. The
distribution of services should never be decided on political grounds, or be
used to deprive any sector of society of its essential supplies.
157. Sir Milton Margai inherited an economy that was fuelled by the export of
diamonds, iron ore, bauxite and cash crops like cocoa and coffee. The first
post-independence government established the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing
Board (SLPMB) to enhance the cultivation and marketing of ginger, cassava, palm
oil, palm kernels, cocoa and coffee. A stabilisation fund was established by
the SLPMB to compensate farmers against fluctuations in world prices for these
commodities.100 Agricultural co-operatives were created all over the
country to help farmers maximise their profits. The regime also established the
Rice Corporation to ensure that the nation's staple food was affordable. The
SLPP failed however to promulgate laws to make the investment climate in the
agricultural sector more attractive.
158. The administration founded the Njala University College near Bo for the
training of agriculturists and teachers, along with Milton Margai Training
College in Freetown to produce teachers for the Junior Secondary School level.
There was free medical care for all students and there was pipe borne water and
electricity for all District Headquarter Towns. The School of Nursing in
Freetown was established during Sir Milton Margai's rule.
159. The Government was able to negotiate with Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST)
to reduce the latter's lease of the country's lucrative diamond fields from 99
years to 36 years. However, there was no arrangement to compensate the people
of Kono District and Tongo for their diamondiferous lands. Instead the
Paramount Chiefs of these localities were paid surface rents which they utilised
for personal enrichment rather than community development.
160. Sir Albert Margai's regime established the central Bank and set up the
first buying and exporting offices for diamond and gold in Kenema, Bo and
Freetown. However, the SLPMB was handled in a very patrimonial and corrupt
manner,101 squandering the state funds required for service
provision. It was also a case of members of the urban elite exploiting rural
people to finance extroverted consumption patterns - the Prime Minister used
monies obtained from the SLPMB to acquire properties abroad.102
161. The APC under Siaka Stevens took two decisions in
the early 1970s that proved disastrous for service provision in the country: the
closure of the railway in 1970 and the dissolution of elected local government
in 1972. These actions cut off efficient service delivery to people in the
Provinces.
162. The economy of Sierra Leone depended heavily on the mining sector,
especially diamonds. A sharp decline in official export rates of diamonds
considerably reduced government revenue during the Stevens years. In 1970, two
million carats of diamonds was the figure officially exported. By 1980, the
export total had dwindled to 595,000 carats. Three years before the conflict,
it had dropped to only 48,000 carats.103
163. The country's woes were compounded by low producer prices for coffee and
cocoa and an unrealistic foreign exchange rate. But it was corruption that
totally ruined the economy. Corrupt acts104 during the APC regime
included the disappearance of a 968 carat Diamond (the feted 'Star of Sierra
Leone') in 1972 and the 'Vouchergate' scandal in late 1970s.105 $100
million was budgeted for the hosting of the OAU in 1980, yet in the event more
than $200 million was spent on it.106 The Governor of the Bank of
Sierra Leone, Mr. Sam Bangura, had opposed the expenditure perhaps too openly
and was allegedly murdered.107
164. The APC oversaw a number a infrastructural construction projects including
the following: the Youyi Building; the Police Headquarters; and the National
Stadium; the Juba Bridge; Hill Cut Road; the Mange and Kambia Bridges; the
Masiaka-Bo Road; the Makeni-Kono Road; the Makeni-Lunsar Road; the Makeni-Kabala
Road; the Bo-Kenema Highway; the Bo-Bandajuma Highway; and the Dodo Hydro
Electric Power Project. Percentage distribution of these infrastructural
achievements shows that 56% were in the Western Area, 30% in the North and 24%
in the South and East. Barely a single infrastructural project was carried out
in a financially sound fashion.
165. Over-centralisation of Government service delivery negatively affected
health services in the regions. Of the total number of between 250 and 300
medical doctors on the eve of the conflict, only 150 served the Provinces, where
the vast majority of the population lived. Thus although the country's
aggregate infant mortality rate was amongst the highest in the world, the
situation was far worse in the Provinces than in the Western Area.108
Sierra Leoneans had a life expectancy of less than 40 years on the eve of the
conflict.
166. The pipe borne water supply was also concentrated entirely in Freetown at
the expense of the Provinces. Whereas throughout the colonial period up to the
first half of the 1970s all District Headquarter towns and some Chiefdom towns
had pipe borne water, none except Bo and Kenema had retained such facilities up
to the eve of the conflict.
167. By 1991, the road network was also in ruins. The total length of roads in
good condition was not more than 160 kilometres for the entire country. The
depleted road network hampered troop movements for the Government's conventional
fighting forces during the conflict.
168. Education clearly did not rank as a priority for successive regimes prior
to the war. A report by the present Government attributes a budgetary
allocation of only 5% to education.109 The APC regime's neglect for
the education sector was exemplified in Krio sayings attributed to President
Stevens, such as: 'Nar sense mek book, nor to book mek sense.'110
There were several "go-slow" strike actions, during which teachers went to
school but refused to teach. As state provision deteriorated in the education
sector, private schools grew, but they were unaffordable to most Sierra Leoneans.
Dropout rates escalated to alarming rates, while many children never went to
school at all. School dropouts and others who never had an education were to
provide easy recruits for the various armed factions during the war.
169. The Stevens regime created eight Integrated Agricultural development
Projects (IDAs) in the country.111 Two factors however hampered
their success:112 they were donor-created; and they had top to bottom
conceptualisation, planning and implementation policies. All the IDA projects
collapsed immediately after donor support was withdrawn.113 Thus
government increasingly imported rice between 1980 and the eve of the conflict,114
draining scarce government resources. Due to dependence on imported rice, the
commodity became a political weapon in the hands of the few politicians who had
access to it. The Army was placated through the constant supply of rice quotas
that were far below the market price. Politicians campaigned with rice and
withdrew rice from Chiefdoms and communities that did not support them.115
170. There was no improvement in the agricultural situation when President Momoh
took over the reins of government. His much-vaunted 'Green Revolution' was more
rhetoric than reality. Dependence on external sources of rice actually
increased. With the general economic decline, high inflation and collapse of
agriculture in the Provinces, the average Sierra Leonean family could hardly
manage to eat one meal a day. While the rural and urban poor were getting
hungrier, the political elite who controlled the import and distribution of rice
became steadily richer.
171. President Momoh inherited an empty Treasury and huge foreign debts.
Economic mismanagement continued unabated. Attempts to control prices in the
first few months of the regime led to an acute shortage of goods. The
government could not find the money to finance a restock. Prices subsequently
rocketed when government rescinded the price control measures. In an attempt to
arrest the dwindling economic fortunes of the state, the government declared a
disastrous state of economic emergency in 1987. Far from remedying existing
woes, the emergency obscured the regulatory climate and provided yet more
opportunities for extortion of money and seizure of property by corrupt state
officials.
PRESENT CHALLENGES
172. Proper governance is still an imperative, unfulfilled objective in Sierra
Leone. Corruption remains rampant and no culture of tolerance or inclusion in
political discourse has yet emerged.
173. Many ex-combatants testified that the conditions that caused them to join
the conflict persist in the country and, if given the opportunity, they would
fight again.
174. Yet, distressingly, the Commission did not detect any sense of urgency
among public officials to respond to the myriad challenges facing the country.
Indeed, the perception within civil society and the international community is
that all efforts at designing and implementing meaningful intervention
programmes, such as the National Recovery Strategy, the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP) or 'Vision 2025', are driven by donors rather than the
national government. This is lamentable.
175. The country has enjoyed peace for four years now. It is a credit to the
government and the international community that Sierra Leoneans are beginning to
sleep soundly again. Nevertheless a culture of silence, or murmured discontent,
typical of the years of APC dictatorship still persists. The boundless energies
of the people cannot be released for economic and social transformation if they
perceive that they and their interests might be harmed if they hold 'politically
incorrect' views or if they dare to be different. The Government needs to be
active in promoting a culture of tolerance and good governance to convince
Sierra Leoneans that the nation's future consists of more than its past has
offered.
CONCLUSION
176. The Commission concludes that all the post-colonial regimes contributed
shamefully in creating the structural and proximate contexts that led to the
conflict in 1991. While the administration of Sir Milton Margai was perhaps
less more tolerable of dissent than his successors, Sir Milton also engaged in
dictatorial and vengeful practices that undermined the unity and cohesion of his
party and laid the foundation for polarisation in the body politic. Terrible
practices of governance began in Sierra Leone's honeymoon period and were
encouraged by Sir Albert Margai, consolidated and then taken to new heights by
Siaka Stevens.
177. The duality of the country's administrative and judicial structures made
them vulnerable to manipulation, which the regimes of Sir Milton Margai, Sir
Albert Margai and Dr. Siaka Stevens duly utilised to their respective
advantages. In the Provincial areas, for example, local courts and Chieftaincy
structures were used to clamp down on opposition activities and to entrench the
authority of whichever traditional ruling houses were allied to the party in
power. Meanwhile the continual assault on the rule of law weakened the
capacities of state institutions to perform.
178. The judiciary was subordinated to the executive, parliament did little more
than 'rubber-stamp', the civil service became a redundant state machine and the
Army and police force became vectors of violence against the very people they
were established to protect. Non-state bodies that ought to ensure
accountability - like media houses or civil society groups - were thoroughly
co-opted. Opposition political parties were suppressed and eventually banned by
President Stevens' One Party Constitution of 1978.
179. Since it appeared impossible to halt the decline of state institutions and
processes through democratic means, a number of Sierra Leoneans became convinced
that the structures of governance could only be changed through violence. The
initial planning for a revolutionary enterprise coincided with the inauguration
of a new APC government under President Joseph Saidu Momoh.
180. Momoh attempted to decelerate the economic and political decline through
the promulgation of an economic state of emergency and a multi-party
constitution. These measures were, however, managed in a dictatorial and
abusive fashion, which rendered them 'too little, too late' to salvage the
situation. Against this backdrop, Sierra Leoneans became increasingly
disgruntled and aggrieved with the malaise in governance and their inability to
do anything to alleviate it. Many citizens, particularly the poor, marginalised
youths of the provinces, became open to radical means of effecting change: they
would readily answer the call to arms when so-called 'revolution' began to enter
the country in 1991.
181. Today the state is an abstract concept to most Sierra Leoneans and central
government has made itself largely irrelevant to their daily lives. In order to
correct this deficit in engagement, an overhaul in the culture of governance is
required. The executive in the post-conflict period needs to prove that is
different from its predecessors in the post-independence period. It needs to
demonstrate ownership, leadership, imagination and determination in developing
and implementing programmes for change. Strong and independent monitoring
institutions must hold the government accountable in this exercise. Only then
will Sierra Leoneans believe that the necessary lessons have been learnt from
the decades of rotten governance that culminated in the tragedy of conflict.
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